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In the last article we began a discussion of Reg. 8
of the CPR which created the general offence of
knowingly or recklessly engaging in a commercial
practice which contravenes the requirement of
professional diligence. In this article we complete
the discussion by examining the question of
‘who’ must have acted
knowingly or recklessly to
commit the offence. As in
previous articles assistance can
be derived from the caselaw on
the Trade Descriptions Act
(TDA). However it is wise to
bear in mind guidance
provided by Briggs J in the
recent case of Office of Fair Trading v Purely
Creative Ltd & Ors [2011] EWHC 106 (Ch), involv-
ing companies charged with breaching the CPRs,
where he describes the approach courts should
take to the interpretation of UK legislation which
is derived from Europe:
Domestic regulations designed to imple-
ment EU directives, and in particular
maximum harmonisation directives, must
be construed as far as possible so as to
implement the purposes and provisions of
the directive. The interpretation of words
and phrases is neither a matter of
grammars nor dictionaries, nor even a
matter of the use of those phrases (or of
the underlying concepts) in national law.
If similar words and phrases are used in
the directive itself, then they must be
interpreted both in the directive and in
the implementing regulations by means
of a process of interpretation which is
independent of the member state's
national law and, for that matter,
independent of any other member state's
national law. For that
purpose the primary
recourse of the national
court is to the jurispru-
dence of the ECJ. The
national court may also
obtain assistance from, but
is not bound by, guidance
issued by the Commission,
and by the decisions of other national
courts as to the meaning of the relevant
directive.
The state of mind of the 
defendant
To say that the defendant must knowingly or
recklessly make a false statement requires that
s/he have a particular state of mind. With most
CPR prosecutions the defendants will be limited
companies which do not of course have either
minds or bodies. In these circumstances the rule
is that a ‘directing mind’ of the company has to
have the requisite state of mind. A directing mind
means someone in the company of such seniority
that he can be regarded as acting as the ‘brains’
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of the company. Managing directors, directors,
company secretaries etc fall into this category. In
a leading TDA case, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v
Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153, Lord Reid said that a
company would only be criminally liable for the
acts of:
‘… the board of directors, the managing
director and perhaps other supervisor
officers of [the] company [who] carry out
the functions of management and speak
and act as the company.’
Lord Diplock, in his speech, said the Articles of
Association of a Company define who is the
directing mind, frequently the directors of the
company.
This point is made quite simply
by the judge in the Best case
discussed in Article Four [2011]
TLQ 90. He said:
The state of the mind of
the company, it is trite law
to say, must be the state of
mind of a person or persons who were
sufficiently in control of the company to
act as its mind for this purpose. It is
agreed that the human person who filled
that role is a gentleman named Mr
Shacalis. [The managing director] For all
effective purposes, Mr. Shacalis was the
appellant company for the purposes of
ascertaining its state of mind.
A case going the other way is Wings v Ellis [1984]
1 All ER 1046. On a charge of recklessly making a
false statement under s.14(1)(b) of the TDA it was
said by Mann J in the Divisional Court in a
decision which was not appealed:
In particular, we reject the respondent’s
suggestion that Michael Stephen-Jones,
who approved the photograph and who
variously called himself a ‘long haul
development manager’ and ‘the contracts
manager’, could be inferred to be a
member of the relevant class. [i.e. the
directing minds of the company]
Thus if no one sufficiently senior in the company
acted knowingly or recklessly then the company
cannot be convicted. That at least is the theory.
However, case law has made inroads into this
principle. In Wings v Ellis when it came to the
House of Lords it was decided that so long as the
directing mind of the company knows the state-
ment is false there is no requirement that there
be knowledge of it being made. Lord Scarman
said:
The day-to-day business activities of
large enterprises, whatever their legal
structure, are necessarily
conducted by their employ-
ees, and particularly by
their sales staff. It follows
that many of the acts
prohibited by the Act will
be the acts of employees
done in the course of the
trade or business and without the knowl-
edge at the time of those who direct the
business. It will become clear that the Act
does cover such acts.
Yugotours Ltd v Wadsley [1988] Crim LR 623, a
case involving a prosecution under s.14(1)(b) for
recklessly making a false statement the court
came close to dispensing with the requirement of
mens rea altogether (see the first edition of
‘Holiday Law, Grant & Mason, 1997 pp.287-289
for a full discussion of the case) but in Airtours v
Shipley (1994) 158 JPN 319 (DC) this view was
rejected. The facts were that Airtours had
featured a hotel in one of their brochures that
was said to have an indoor swimming pool. This
was not the case. The hotel did not have and
never had had an indoor swimming pool. Airtours
conceded that the false statement had somehow
crept into the brochure because of a mistake at
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head office—which they could not explain. This
was despite an errata policy which the court
described as an ‘excellent system’. (See Cooper,
Due Diligence—The Tour Operator’s View [1994]
TLJ 11 for a discussion of errata systems.) The
errata policy, although devised by the directing
minds of Airtours, was operated by middle
management who were directly responsible to
the directors.
A prosecution under s.14(1)(b) for recklessly
making a false statement succeeded in the
magistrates’ court. The magistrates said that
although Mrs Bryan, the Overseas Operations
Controller at Airtours responsi-
ble for the brochure, was not
one of the directing minds of
the company nevertheless the
company could be convicted
because the directors had
‘delegated’ their functions to
her. In other words she became
the directing mind of the
company for this purpose.
However on appeal to the Divisional Court the
decision was overturned. The court said that the
justices reliance on a theory of delegation was
based upon a selective reading of the judgments
in Tesco v Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127. Although
it is perfectly possible for a board of directors to
delegate its functions to others, and Tesco v
Nattrass confirms this, the case actually decided
that on the facts no delegation had taken place.
The Divisional Court preferred to adopt the
reasoning from the Tesco case that concluded
there was no delegation. McCowan LJ in the
Divisional Court quoted the following passage by
Lord Morris from the Tesco case:
My Lords, with respect, I do not think that
there was any feature of delegation in
the present case. The company had its
responsibilities in regard to taking all
reasonable precautions and exercising all
due diligence. The careful and effective
discharge of those responsibilities
required the directing mind and will of
the company. A system had to be created
which could rationally be said to be so
designed that the commission of offences
would be avoided. There was no such
delegation to the manager of a particular
store. He did not function as the directing
mind or will of the company. His duties as
the manager of one store did not involve
managing the company. He was one who
was being directed. He was one who was
employed but he was not a delegate to
whom the company passed on its respon-
sibilities. He had certain duties which
were the result of the
taking by the company of
all reasonable precautions
and of the exercising by the
company of all due
diligence. He was a person
under the control of the
company. He was, so to
speak, a cog in the machine which was
devised: it was not left to him to devise it.
He also adopted the skeleton argument put up by
counsel for Airtours:
It is contended by the appellant that Mrs
Bryan only had a discretion to produce
the holiday brochure in question and that
such a discretion was limited by the
errata policy of checking for mistakes set
up by the directors. The directors of the
appellant company had, therefore, not
delegated their authority to run and
manage the appellant company but had
simply employed Mrs Bryan to produce a
holiday brochure within set guidelines
and procedures. Mrs Bryan had not been
given full discretion to act independently
of instruction from the directors but had
been given a measure of discretion to
produce the holiday brochure in question
within the framework of instructions
embraced by the errata policy document.
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The directors of the appellant company
simply, therefore, employed Mrs Bryan to
work within a system that had been
created and designed so that the
commission of offences would be
avoided. Her duties did not involve
managing the company but preparing a
company brochure. She was, so to speak,
a cog in the machine which was devised
and it was not left to her to devise it.
Thus Airtours were not guilty on the grounds that
any recklessness that occurred was not that of
the directing minds of the company or anyone to
whom they had delegated any authority to
manage the company. The company itself was
not reckless because by setting up a proper errata
system and ensuring that it operated effectively
they were having regard to the
truth or falsity of the state-
ments in the brochure
(s.14(2)(b)).
On the question of the
Yugotours case although the
court was unable to overrule
that decision it went out of its
way to cast doubt on its authority. It suggested
that the reasoning was a ‘radical departure from
principle and authority’. It also said that insofar
as it cast doubt on the decision of Mann J on the
issue of recklessness in the Wings case it was also
wrong. (See Bragg ‘Recklessness and Authority’
[1996] TLJ 97 for a discussion of the Airtours
case.)
Looking beyond the narrow confines of travel law
and the TDA for assistance on this question of
attributing the knowledge of senior managers to
their companies the problem was examined in
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v
Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500 by the
Privy Council. They said that whether there could
be such attribution depended upon the interpre-
tation to be placed upon the statute imposing
liability and the policy it sought to achieve and
that different statutes might treat the actions of
employees differently. However on the issue of
the TDA they seemed content with the approach
adopted by the House of Lords in the Tesco case.
If we apply this caselaw to the CPR what would
be the outcome? Would there be a conviction in
Airtours v Shipley under Reg. 8 if the facts were
to re-occur today? Could the directing minds of
the company be said to be ‘recklessly’ engaging in
a commercial practice which contravened the
requirements of professional diligence? If, as in
the Airtours case, the directors
had devised an ‘excellent’
errata system, designed to
eliminate brochure errors if
operated properly, and a lowly
employee, a mere ‘cog in the
machine’, had failed to follow
the system correctly then it is
difficult to see how the
company could be convicted. Put another way,
the directors would have had regard to whether
the company was engaging in a commercial
practice which contravened the requirements of
professional diligence.
Of course if the directors had not devised an
errata system at all then the company would be
guilty of an offence because then there would
have been no regard to whether the company
was engaging in a commercial practice which
contravened the requirements of professional
diligence.
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